In January 2012, influenza virus researchers from around the world announced a voluntary pause of 60 days on any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses leading to the generation of viruses that are more transmissible in mammals 1 . We declared a pause to this important research to provide time to explain the public-health benefits of this work, to describe the measures in place to minimize possible risks, and to enable organizations and governments around the world to review their policies (for example, on biosafety, biosecurity, oversight and communication) regarding these experiments.
During the past year, the benefits of this important research have been explained clearly in publications [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] and meetings [8] [9] [10] . Measures to mitigate the possible risks of the work have been detailed [11] [12] [13] . The World Health Organization has released recommendations on laboratory biosafety for those conducting this research 14 , and relevant authorities in several countries have reviewed the biosafety, biosecurity and funding conditions under which further research would be conducted on the laboratory-modified H5N1 viruses 10, [15] [16] [17] . Thus, acknowledging that the aims of the voluntary moratorium have been met in some countries and are close to being met in others, we declare an end to the voluntary moratorium on avian-flu transmission studies.
The controversy surrounding H5N1 virus-transmission research has highlighted the need for a global approach to dealing with dual-use research of concern. Developing comprehensive solutions to resolve all the issues will take time. Meanwhile, H5N1 viruses continue to evolve in nature.
Because H5N1 virustransmission studies are essential for pandemic preparedness and understanding the adaptation of influenza viruses to mammals, researchers who have approval from their governments and institutions to conduct this research safely, under appropriate biosafety and biosecurity conditions, have a public-health responsibility to resume this important work. Scientists should not restart their work in countries where, as yet, no decision has been reached on the conditions for H5N1 virus transmission research. At this time, this includes the United States and US-funded research conducted in other countries. Scientists should never conduct this type of research without the appropriate facilities, oversight and all necessary approvals.
We consider biosafety level 3 conditions with the considerable enhancements (BSL-3+) as outlined in the referenced publications [11] [12] [13] to be appropriate for this type of work, but recognize that some countries may require BSL-4 conditions Sustain the future by doing more with less
The term sustainabilityoriginally conceived to mean doing more with less -is now used to describe development that meets current needs without compromising those of future generations (World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future, 1987). As food shortages increase and the global population expands, it is time to revisit the original concept of sustainability.
In accepting the idea of sustainable development as politically correct and allencompassing, scientists and policy-makers have created a world in which 'sustainability' can be used both to defend and to attack environmental policy. Sustainability needs to be rebranded, for example by shifting consumer focus from greenness to payback and efficiency, and by differentiating between the private costs of policy implementation and the social cost of non-implementation (M. Csutora and Á. Zsóka J. Consum. Policy 34, 67-90; 2011).
The world has changed since 1987, and that 'future generation' has been born. Policies that promote sustainability should aim to provide the best life for as many people as possible -by doing more with less. Brian G. 
